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Performance on traditional selective attention tasks, like the Stroop and flanker protocols, 
is subject to modulation by trial history, whereby the magnitude of congruency (or conflict) 
effects is often found to decrease following an incongruent trial compared to a congruent one. 
These “congruency sequence effects” (CSEs) typically appear to reflect a mesh of memory- 
and attention-based processes. The current study aimed to shed new light on the nature of 
the attention-based contribution to CSEs, by characterizing the shape of the CSE time-course 
while controlling for mnemonic influences. Existing attention-based accounts of CSEs are 
either ambiguous in their predictions of CSE time-courses, or predict CSEs to persist or grow 
over the post-stimulus/response interval in anticipation of an upcoming stimulus. We gauged 
CSE time-courses by systematically varying inter-stimulus (Experiment 1) and response-to-
stimulus (Experiment 2) intervals across a wide temporal range, in a face–word Stroop task. 
In spite of an exponential increase in the likelihood of stimulus appearance with increasing 
interval duration (i.e., an exponential hazard function), results from both experiments showed 
CSEs to be most pronounced at the shortest intervals, to quickly decay in magnitude with 
increasing interval length, and to be absent at longer intervals. These data refute the idea that 
attentional contributions to CSEs remain static over post-stimulus/response intervals and 
are incompatible with the notion that CSEs reflect expectation-guided preparatory biasing in 
anticipation of a forthcoming stimulus. The data are compatible, however, with the notion that 
attentional contributions to CSEs reflect a short-lived, phasic enhancement of attentional set 
in reaction to processing conflict.
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have generally fostered the conclusion that both mnemonic and 
 attentional influences contribute to this data pattern (Wühr, 
2005; Wühr and Ansorge, 2005; Notebaert et al., 2006; Akcay and 
Hazeltine, 2007; Egner, 2007; Notebaert and Verguts, 2007; Bugg, 
2008; Chen and Melara, 2009; Davelaar and Stevens, 2009). The 
experiments reported in the current study explicitly controlled for 
possible contributions of associative effects across successive trials 
(see Materials and Methods), and we will here therefore forego 
an in-depth discussion of mnemonic models of CSEs. Rather, the 
present work aimed to characterize more closely the nature of the 
attention-based contribution to CSEs. Specifically, we were inter-
ested in delineating the typical time-course of CSEs, and relating it 
to current attention-based models of CSEs.
Two main accounts of attentional influences on CSEs can be 
distinguished in the current literature, namely, a conflict-driven 
model (Botvinick et al., 2001) and an expectation-based account 
(Gratton et al., 1992). The former view casts CSEs as reflecting 
“conflict adaptation”, the workings of a regulatory mechanism that 
uses internal processing conflicts as control-recruiting signals in 
the online regulation of a current task-set. Specifically, the conflict-
monitoring model of cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001) argues 
that CSEs are due to conflict (defined as concurrent activation of 
mutually incompatible stimulus or response representations) that 
IntroductIon
The efficiency of attention and response selection processes is 
strongly affected by our recent interactions with the environment. 
For example, in the classic color-naming Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; 
MacLeod, 1991), subjects indicate the print color of a word stimulus 
whose meaning is either congruent (e.g., the word RED printed in 
red ink) or incongruent (e.g., the word BLUE printed in red ink) 
with that color. Performance is reliably slower in the incongruent 
condition (the Stroop congruency effect), because the necessary 
disambiguation of the conflicting relevant and irrelevant stimu-
lus features, and their respective response associations, imposes 
additional attentional processing demands (Cohen et al., 1990; 
MacLeod, 1991). Importantly, this congruency (or conflict) effect 
is modulated by trial history, whereby the degree of conflict is often 
found to be reduced following an incongruent as compared to a 
congruent stimulus trial (Gratton et al., 1992; for reviews, see Egner, 
2007, 2008). However, the precise nature of the mechanisms mediat-
ing these congruency sequence effects (CSEs) remains contested.
A major distinction can be drawn between top-down attention-
based (Gratton et al., 1992; Botvinick et al., 2001) and bottom-up 
mnemonic/associational accounts (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel, 
2004; Hommel et al., 2004) for CSEs, although empirical stud-
ies aimed at disentangling these proposed sources of the effect 
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in anticipation of the forthcoming stimulus, akin to probabilistic 
cueing effects in the attention literature (e.g., Sanders, 1971; Muller 
and Rabbitt, 1989).
Extant relevant data pertaining to CSE time-courses are sparse. 
While the jittering of inter-trial intervals across a range of a few 
seconds is standard practice in neuroimaging studies of CSEs (e.g., 
Egner and Hirsch, 2005a,b; Egner et al., 2007, 2008), their minimum 
interval length typically lies around 3 s, thus precluding an analysis 
at shorter ranges. Moreover, previous behavioral studies addressing 
the time-course of CSEs tested only very few (two) time points, 
and at vastly different ranges, specifically, 50 vs. 200 ms (Notebaert 
et al., 2006), and 1,500 vs. 6,000 ms (Wühr and Ansorge, 2005). In 
order to obtain a finer-grained picture of the time-course of CSEs, 
we here manipulated stimulus timing in two Stroop-type experi-
ments across a wide temporal range. In the first experiment, we 
employed a fixed stimulus duration and varied the inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) (following Wühr and Ansorge, 2005) as defined by 
the duration between the offset of the previous stimulus and the 
onset of the next one, across a range of 500–7,000 ms. In the sec-
ond experiment, stimulus duration was determined by response 
time (RT), and we varied the interval between the response to the 
previous stimulus and the onset of the next stimulus (response-to-
stimulus interval, RSI) (following Notebaert et al., 2006), across a 
range of 500–5,000 ms.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
The sample consisted of 20 healthy subjects, 10 per experiment 
(Experiment 1: six males, four females, mean age = 23.7; Experiment 
2: five males, five females, mean age = 18.7). Subjects had been 
screened via self-report to exclude participants with a history of 
serious medical illness (including psychiatric diagnoses), previous 
or current drug abuse, and current usage of drugs that might affect 
their alertness levels. Inclusion criteria consisted of fluent English 
language proficiency and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Subjects were recruited by flyer and email advertisement, and per-
formed the tasks in exchange for course credits or a payment of 
$10. The study was approved by the institutional review board of 
Duke University (Pro00018918).
aPParatus and stIMulI
For both experiments, stimulus presentation and response 
data collection were accomplished using Presentation software 
(NeuroBehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) and Dell Optiplex 
960 personal computers, running on Intel Dual Core processors. 
Subjects viewed stimuli displayed on Dell 19′ LCD monitors, 
while having their chin placed on a table-clamp chinrest (Veatch 
Ophthalmic Instruments, Tempe, AZ, USA) to assure a constant 
distance between their eyes and the monitor (at ∼60 cm). Responses 
were collected via a Dell QWERTY US keyboard, with the right 
index finger response collected from the “.” key, and the right mid-
dle finger response collected from the “/” key. Data were analyzed 
using SPSS statistical software (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The 
stimulus set consisted of 24 photographic, black and white images 
of male and female faces (12 for each gender). Each face image was 
paired with a congruent and an incongruent gender label (“male”, 
“female”) that could be either printed in lower or upper case (in 
occurs during an incongruent trial triggering a reinforcement of 
the current task-set. In the Stroop task, this would correspond to 
enhancing the focus of top-down attention toward the processing 
of the task-relevant relative to the task-irrelevant stimulus feature 
(reflecting the current task-set). This conflict-triggered reinforce-
ment of top-down attention following an incongruent trial results 
in a dampening of the influence of the task-irrelevant stimulus 
feature on response selection, reflected in the subsequent trial in 
the shape of improved performance on incongruent trials (due to 
reduced interference from incongruent task-irrelevant stimulus fea-
tures) and poorer performance on congruent trials (due to reduced 
facilitation from congruent task-irrelevant stimulus features), thus 
producing the CSE.
By contrast, Gratton et al. (1992) have conceptualized CSEs as 
stemming from specific expectations regarding the congruency of 
the forthcoming stimulus. According to this view, subjects harbor 
the expectation that the congruency of an upcoming stimulus 
will match that of the preceding stimulus (cf. Remington, 1969) 
and, accordingly, they bias their attentional focus in anticipa-
tion of the expected stimulus type. If the stimulus is expected 
to be congruent, the attentional focus is “loosened” in order to 
derive the benefit of congruent task-irrelevant stimulus features, 
which results in fast responses to congruent but slow responses 
to incongruent stimuli. If an incongruent stimulus is expected, 
attention is strategically focused more tightly on the task-relevant 
stimulus feature, speeding up the response to incongruent trials 
but slowing the response to congruent ones, thus producing the 
CSE data pattern (Gratton et al., 1992). Under this view then, 
the CSE is an expression of a proactive process, namely, the stra-
tegic preparation for an expected stimulus, and Gratton et al. 
(1992) have argued that this process is in fact precisely equiva-
lent to the type of preparation that takes place when subjects are 
explicitly cued about the congruency of a forthcoming stimulus 
(Experiment 3).
What kind of a time-course of CSEs do these models imply? It 
is not straightforward to derive the relevant prediction from the 
conflict-monitoring model, which could be read in two ways. On 
the one hand, the model describes conflict adaptation as a reactive, 
quasi-homeostatic process where the reinforcement of top-down 
attention is an obligatory and immediate consequence of conflict. 
Pairing this conception with the reasonable assumption that this 
reinforced attention is subject to temporal decay, one could come 
to the conclusion that the model predicts CSEs to be of high magni-
tude at short post-stimulus/response intervals, and to diminish over 
time thereafter (see also Gao et al., 2009), thus producing a phasic 
or transient post-stimulus/response CSE. On the other hand, the 
original computational implementation of the conflict-monitoring 
model of CSEs simulated conflict-triggered control as decaying not 
over units of time (or processing cycles) between trials but rather as 
diminishing across units of trials (Botvinick et al., 2001). According 
to this conception, the precise amount of time passing between trial 
n and n + 1 would be irrelevant to the magnitude of CSEs at n + 1, 
that is, CSE magnitude would remain static across the inter-trial 
interval. Predictions from the expectation-based model are less 
ambiguous. Since this model views CSEs as resulting from an active, 
preparatory process, one would expect the effect to take some time 
to establish itself, and then to build up (or at least  persist) over time 
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One motivation for conducting one experiment manipulating 
ISI and another experiment manipulating RSI duration, beyond 
the attempt to relate the current results to previous studies (Wühr 
and Ansorge, 2005; Notebaert et al., 2006), is that, a priori, it is 
not certain which of these interval variables will be more effective 
in modulating CSE magnitudes. In addition, the two approaches 
incorporate opposing biases with respect to slow and fast responses. 
Specifically, if one manipulates ISI duration, then faster trials (e.g., 
congruent ones) end up being associated with a longer RSI than 
slower trials (e.g., incongruent ones). On the other hand, if one 
manipulates RSI duration, then faster trials (e.g., congruent ones) 
will be associated with a shorter ISI than slower trials (e.g., incon-
gruent ones). We reasoned that performing both types of manipula-
tion guards against the possibility of our conclusions being biased 
by the particular choice of interval measure.
Stimuli were presented in pseudo-random sequences that 
obeyed the following constraints. First, half of all trials were con-
gruent, and half incongruent, and the stimulus sequences for each 
block produced equal numbers of congruent stimuli preceded by 
a congruent stimulus (CC trials), incongruent stimuli preceded 
by a congruent stimulus (CI trials), congruent stimuli preceded 
by an incongruent stimulus (IC trials), and incongruent stimuli 
preceded by an incongruent stimulus (II trials) (after dropping the 
first trial in each block). Second, each of these trial types was paired 
equally often with each ISI (or RSI) level. This resulted in equal 
cell counts across a three-factor 2 × 2 × 10 (previous trial congru-
ency × current trial congruency × ISI/RSI level) repeated-measures 
factorial design. Third, each cell in the design was associated with 
equal numbers of male and female face target stimuli. Fourth, indi-
vidual face stimuli (i.e., the task-relevant stimulus feature) were 
never repeated across successive trials, and gender labels (i.e., the 
task-irrelevant stimulus feature) always alternated between lower 
and upper case lettering from trial to trial (irrespective of whether 
the gender label category switched or not). This ensured that no 
exact visual stimulus features were ever repeated across successive 
trials. Finally, each condition in the factorial design was associated 
with a response repetition on half of the trials, and a response 
Ariel font), resulting in a total of 96 unique stimuli (see Figure 1 
for two examples). The gender labels were presented in red ink and 
placed across the center of the faces (the bridge of the nose) without 
obscuring the eyes or mouth regions of the face stimuli. The faces 
subtended circa 9° of visual angle vertically and 6° horizontally. 
The gender labels subtended circa 2° of visual angle vertically, and 
5–7° horizontally.
Procedure and desIgn
In both experiments, subjects performed a gender face–word 
Stroop task (Egner et al., 2008). On each trial, participants were 
presented with a compound face–word stimulus, consisting of a 
face and an overlaid gender label (Figure 1), where the relation 
between the task-relevant face stimulus and the task-irrelevant 
gender label could be either congruent (e.g., a male face with a 
“male” label) or incongruent (e.g., a male face with a “female” 
label). Subjects were required to categorize, as fast as possible 
while maintaining high accuracy, whether the face stimulus 
depicted a male or female person, by means of a button press 
(using index and middle fingers of the right hand). In Experiment 
1, the stimuli were on screen for a fixed duration of 1,000 ms, 
whereas for Experiment 2, stimuli were shown until a response 
was recorded. Each stimulus was followed by variable intervals 
during which a small central fixation cross (circa 0.3° × 0.3° of 
visual angle) was displayed. In Experiment 1, the interval timing 
was determined by the ISI (offset-to-onset), which was varied 
across 10 levels (500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, 2,500, 3,000, 4,000, 5,000, 
6,000, and 7,000 ms). In Experiment 2, the interval timing was 
manipulated as a function of RSI, varying across 10 RSI levels 
(500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, 2,500, 3,000, 3,500, 4,000, 4,500, and 
5,000 ms). In Experiment 1, each subject performed 16 blocks of 
101 trials, in Experiment 2, each subject performed 8 blocks of 
101 trials. The different ISI (or RSI) levels were drawn in random 
order from a uniform distribution. It is noteworthy that the lat-
ter results in an exponential increase in the hazard function (the 
likelihood of the stimulus appearing at the next interval) with 
increasing interval length.
Figure 1 | example stimuli and trial sequence. A congruent stimulus on trial n is followed by an incongruent stimulus on trial n + 1, resulting in a CI (congruent–
incongruent) trial at n + 1. This example CI trial is associated with a response repetition, while both relevant (face) and irrelevant (gender label) stimulus features 
change across trials.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition  September 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 154 | 4
Egner et al. Time-course of congruency sequence effects
analysIs
Data analyses focused on mean RTs, being the most commonly 
employed indicator of CSEs in the literature. Accuracy in both 
experiments was near ceiling (Experiment 1: 96.1%, SD = 2.1; 
Experiment 2: 97.6%, SD = 1.3), and error rates were considered 
only for ruling out speed-accuracy trade-offs as mediating the RT 
results. For each subject, mean RT was computed for each condi-
tion of the design. Error trials and trials immediately following an 
error were excluded from the RT averaging. Trials where responses 
were >2 SDs removed from the subject’s grand mean RT were also 
removed from the averaging process. These procedures resulted in 
the removal of <3% of RT data points in both experiments. For the 
sake of statistical reliability and clarity of presentation, we tempo-
rally smoothed the ISI/RSI factor, by averaging adjacent pairs of 
intervals together (i.e., we averaged intervals 1 and 2, intervals 3 and 
4, etc.), thus resulting in five time bins in each experiment. Mean RT 
data were analyzed in 2 × 2 × 5 (previous trial congruency × current 
trial congruency × ISI/RSI interval) repeated measures ANOVAs, 
followed by planned pair-wise comparisons between CSE scores 
([CI − CC] − [II − IC]) at different time bins, and planned previ-
ous × current trial congruency analyses within each time bin.
results
exPerIMent 1 – IsI ManIPulatIon
Experiment 1 manipulated the time interval between the off-
set of the previous stimulus and the onset of the forthcoming 
stimulus (ISI), without consideration of the timing of the sub-
jects’ response to the stimuli, and with a fixed stimulus dura-
tion of 1 s, akin to the approach taken by Wühr and Ansorge 
(2005). Analyzing the RT data, a three-way 2 × 2 × 5 (previ-
ous trial congruency × current trial congruency × ISI) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a standard interference effect, reflected 
in a main effect of current trial congruency (F[1, 9] = 15.8, 
p < 0.005), due to slower RTs for incongruent (mean = 597 ms, 
SD = 58) than for congruent trials (mean = 581 ms, SD = 55). 
The classic CSE was also observed (Figure 2A), as evidenced by a 
switch for the other half. In the lingo of associational accounts for 
CSEs (Hommel et al., 2004), this stimulus sequencing ensured that 
each condition in our design consisted of 50% “complete alterna-
tions” (all stimulus features and the response switch across trials) 
and 50% “partial repetitions” (all stimulus features switch but the 
response repeats across trials). Figure 1 depicts an example of a CI 
partial repetition trial. Thus, potential associational influences on 
CSEs were balanced out between all of the conditions of interest 
in this design.
It should be noted though that the control over associational 
sequence effects at the level of specific stimulus features does not 
necessarily preclude the possibility of similar effects occurring at the 
level of stimulus categories (e.g., Schuch and Koch, 2004; Egner and 
Hirsch, 2005a), for example, the incurrence of categorical “partial 
repetition” costs for response repetitions accompanied by changes 
in stimulus category (male vs. female). However, such categorical 
priming or binding effects are unlikely to confound CSEs in the cur-
rent study. First, because the task is categorical in nature, a change 
in the relevant, target stimulus feature category (face gender) is 
always associated with a change in response, and a repetition of 
category is always associated with a response repetition, thus pre-
cluding partial repetitions. Moreover, as noted above, the incidence 
of response (and thus target feature) repetitions and alternations 
were evenly distributed within each of our conditions of interest. 
With respect to the relation between categorical transitions of the 
irrelevant stimulus feature (the word labels) and response transi-
tions, if such effects existed, they would bias against obtaining a CSE 
in the current experiment, because such “irrelevant partial repeti-
tions” of category never occur in CC trials, occur on average in 25% 
of CI and IC trials, and in 50% of II trials. These hypothetical RT 
costs would thus produce a pattern of results counter-productive 
to the CSE effect (where II trials are faster than CI trials). Potential 
priming effects involving the irrelevant stimulus category transi-
tions would therefore not be able to mimic CSEs in the current 
experiment, but we cannot exclude the possibility that they affect 
the data per se.
Figure 2 | Congruency sequence effects as a function of iSi length. (A) Mean 
RT data as a function of previous and current trial congruency, displaying the 
classic CSE data pattern. Con, congruent trial; Inc, incongruent trial. (B) The 
magnitude of the CSE ([CI − CC] − [II − IC]) as a function of ISI duration (positive 
values indicate the magnitude of RT reduction following an incongruent compared 
to a congruent trial). ISI time bins: 1 = 500–1,000 ms, 2 = 1,500–2,000 ms, 
3 = 2,500–3,000 ms, 4 = 4,000–5,000 ms, 5 = 6,000–7,000 ms. Error bars reflect 
mean standard errors (after Masson and Loftus, 2003) for CSE interaction effects.
www.frontiersin.org September 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 154 | 5
Egner et al. Time-course of congruency sequence effects
to a speed-accuracy trade-off, but is in line with many previous 
studies documenting that CSEs in RT are typically accompanied 
by corresponding effects in accuracy (Egner, 2007).
exPerIMent 2 – rsI ManIPulatIon
In Experiment 2, we aimed to establish whether the data pattern 
observed in Experiment 1 would be robust to some procedural 
modifications that would bring the experimental design in line 
with the approach taken by Notebaert et al. (2006). Specifically, 
instead of manipulating ISI and having a fixed stimulus dura-
tion, Experiment 2 displayed stimuli until a response occurred, 
and varied the interval between the response and the forthcoming 
stimulus (RSI), thus tying the timing intervals directly to subjects’ 
responses. Analyzing the RT data, a three-way 2 × 2 × 5 (previ-
ous trial congruency × current trial congruency × RSI) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a standard interference effect of current 
trial congruency (F[1, 9] = 10.3, p < 0.05), as incongruent trials 
were associated with slower RT (mean = 767, SD = 158) than con-
gruent ones (mean = 697, SD = 113). The overall CSE was only 
marginally significant (previous × current trial congruency inter-
action: F[1, 9] = 3.3, p = 0.10), with numerically smaller conflict 
scores following incongruent (mean = 80 ms) than congruent trials 
(mean = 60 ms) (see Figure 3A).
Importantly, there was a significant three-way interaction 
between previous and current trial congruency, and RSI (F[4, 
36] = 2.77, p < 0.05). As displayed in Figure 3B, CSEs varied with 
RSI, being present at shorter but not at longer RSIs. Significant 
previous × current trial congruency interactions were found at RSI 
time bin 1 (500–1,000 ms, F[1, 9] = 5.6, p < 0.05) and time bin 2 
(1,500–2,000 ms, F[1, 9] = 13.8, p < 0.01), but not at time bins 3 
(2,500–3,000 ms), 4 (3,500–4,000 ms), and 5 (4,500–5,000 ms). 
Pair-wise t-tests between CSE scores showed that the effect was 
significantly larger at time bin 1 than at bin 3 (t[9] = 2.6, p < 0.05) 
and (marginally) bin 4 (t[9] = 2.1, p = 0.06), and that the effect 
was larger at bin 2 than bin 3 (t[9] = 2.9, p < 0.05). Given the 
visual impression in Figure 3B that CSEs may have tended to 
 significant  previous × current trial congruency interaction effect 
(F[1, 9] = 16.5, p < 0.005) that was due to smaller conflict scores 
following incongruent trials (mean = 6 ms) than following con-
gruent trials (mean = 23 ms).
Importantly, we also observed a three-way previous × current 
trial congruency × ISI interaction effect (F[4, 36] = 4.7, p < 0.005). 
As can be seen in Figure 2B, this interaction appeared to stem 
from the fact that the CSE steadily declined with increasing ISI 
length (polynomial linear trend, F[1, 9] = 10.0, p < 0.05). A signifi-
cant CSE was present at time bin 1 (500–1,000 ms, F[1, 9] = 14.7, 
p < 0.005), bin 2 (1,500–2,000 ms, F[1, 9] = 17.6, p < 0.005), and bin 
3 (2,500–3,000 ms, F[1, 9] = 5.6, p < 0.05), but the effect was absent 
during time bins 4 (4,000–5,000 ms) and 5 (6,000–7,000 ms). Pair-
wise t-tests between CSE scores showed that the effect was signifi-
cantly larger at time bin 1 than at bin 3 (t[9] = 2.5, p < 0.05), bin 
4 (t[9] = 2.4, p < 0.05), and bin 5 (t[9] = 2.7, p < 0.05). The effect 
was also stronger at time bin 2 than at bin 4 (marginally, t[9] = 2.1, 
p = 0.07) and bin 5 (t[9] = 3.7, p < 0.01). Finally, the ANOVA also 
detected an unexpected interaction between previous trial con-
gruency and ISI (F[4, 36] = 4.1, p < 0.01), which appeared to be 
attributable to generally faster RTs following incongruent trials in 
time bin 1 (t[9] = 5.4, p < 0.001), accompanied by an absence of 
such effects in all of the later time intervals. In summary, the RT 
data from Experiment 1 show that the CSE steadily diminishes 
with increasing ISI.
In order to ascertain that the RT CSE, and its variation across 
ISI intervals, was not mediated by an inverse tendency for response 
accuracy (i.e., a speed-accuracy trade-off), we correlated the RT 
CSE magnitude (i.e., the relative reduction in conflict following 
incongruent as compared to congruent trials) at each ISI with 
the corresponding effect in error rates across subjects. These 
correlations were either non-significant or positive (time bin 1: 
r[10] = 0.79, p < 0.01; time bin 3: r[10] = 0.62, p = 0.06), meaning 
that subjects with a higher reduction in RT congruency effects fol-
lowing an incongruent trial tended to also display a greater reduc-
tion in the error rate congruency effect. This pattern runs opposite 
Figure 3 | Congruency sequence effects as a function of rSi length. 
(A) Mean RT data as a function of previous and current trial congruency, displaying 
the classic CSE data pattern. Con, congruent trial; Inc, incongruent trial. (B) The 
magnitude of the CSE ([CI − CC] − [II − IC]) as a function of RSI duration (positive 
values indicate the magnitude of RT reduction following an incongruent compared 
to a congruent trial). RSI time bins: 1 = 500–1,000 ms, 2 = 1,500–2,000 ms, 
3 = 2,500–3,000 ms, 4 = 3,500–4,000 ms, 5 = 4,500–5,000 ms. Error bars reflect 
mean standard errors (after Masson and Loftus, 2003) for CSE interaction effects.
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underpin across-trial adjustments (Boy et al., 2010). However, 
whether CSEs are an expression of the former or the latter cur-
rently remains an open question.
In addition to these findings directly pertinent to our a priori 
hypotheses, an unexpected interaction effect involving previous trial 
congruency and ISI/RSI was found in both experiments, which was 
due to faster mean RTs following an incongruent trial at the shortest 
post-stimulus/response intervals only. We speculate that this effect 
could feasibly reflect a very short-lived increase in arousal accom-
panying the processing of a conflicting stimulus (cf. Verguts and 
Notebaert, 2009), which then translates into a brief non- selective 
speed-up of RTs at short post-stimulus/response intervals.
With respect to an expectation-based, preparatory account of 
CSEs, it should be pointed out that our experimental design was 
in fact quite favorable to the possibility of expectation-mediated 
improvements in performance at longer intervals, because the uni-
form distribution of ISI/RSI intervals produced an exponentially 
growing hazard function across the post-stimulus/response inter-
vals. In other words, the likelihood of stimulus occurrence grew 
exponentially with each passing interval where no stimulus was 
presented. There was in fact some evidence that subjects did form 
expectations in this regard, as mean RT in Experiment 2 (though 
not in Experiment 1) displayed the expected speed-up (numeri-
cally) with increasing interval duration (mean RT being 754, 730, 
730, 731, and 717 ms for bins 1–5, respectively). Nevertheless, we 
did not detect any evidence that subjects made strategic use of this 
temporal profile with respect to the implementation of purported 
anticipatory attentional biasing as reflected in CSE magnitude. The 
lack of a positive correlation between the CSE magnitude and RSI 
duration in the current study stands in stark contrast with findings 
in fairly similar contexts, where the effects of expectation have been 
clearly observed to build up over post-stimulus/response inter-
vals. For instance, in 2AFC tasks, “subjective expectancy” effects for 
the continuation of a particular higher-order stimulus sequence 
increase reliably with RSI duration (e.g., Soetens et al., 1985). 
These findings further support the conclusion that expectations 
are unlikely to be the prime mediator of CSEs. In their rejection 
of the expectation-based account of CSEs, the present data are 
also in line with other recent findings that suggest the processes 
mediating CSEs are not equivalent to the processes that mediate 
the effects of cue-induced expectations. Specifically, Alpay et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that explicit cueing of congruency, on the 
one hand, and congruency sequence per se, on the other hand, 
produce additive effects on performance. This raises substantial 
doubts concerning the validity of the central assumption of the 
expectation-based account, that CSEs are mediated by the same 
processes that underlie the effects of explicitly cueing stimulus 
congruency (Gratton et al., 1992).
As noted in the Section “Introduction”, previous studies have 
not explored the time-course of CSEs in any great detail. Notebaert 
et al. (2006) varied RSIs between 50 and 200 ms and reported a 
significant CSE only at the longer interval, concluding that the 
control processes presumed to mediate the CSE require more than 
50 ms following response execution to be implemented but to 
be already effective at 200 ms post-response. Wühr and Ansorge 
(2005) varied stimulus onset asynchrony between 1,500 and 
6,000 ms, with a fixed stimulus duration of 250 ms,  corresponding 
increase around bin 5, we decomposed this bin into its constituents 
(4,500 and 5,000 ms RSI bins) and tested each of them for CSEs. 
Neither RSI bin was associated with significant CSEs, however 
(both p values >0.4). Finally, similar to Experiment 1, an interac-
tion effect was also observed between previous trial congruency 
and RSI interval (F[4, 36] = 3.23, p < 0.05), which was related to a 
general speed-up in RT following incongruent trials in time bin 1 
(t[9] = 2.3, p < 0.05) and a general slow-sown following incongru-
ent trials in time bin 2 (t[9] = 2.8, p < 0.05). To summarize, RT 
data from Experiment 2 show that CSEs decrease with increasing 
RSI length, similar to the data pattern observed for varying ISIs 
in Experiment 1.
As in Experiment 1, we correlated RT and error rate congruency 
sequent effect scores across subjects to rule out speed-accuracy 
trade-offs as a source of the RT findings. No significant associa-
tions were detected.
dIscussIon
To characterize the shape of the time-course of (attention-
mediated) CSEs, we manipulated ISI (Experiment 1) and RSI 
(Experiment 2) duration in a Stroop-type task, across a relatively 
large temporal range, and measured how CSE magnitude varied 
with post-stimulus/response interval duration. The results were 
clear-cut, in that both experiments produced interaction effects 
between the CSE (the previous × current trial congruency inter-
action) and the ISI/RSI factor, with significant CSEs evident at 
the shortest post-stimulus/response intervals, but not at longer 
intervals. These results are not commensurate with the original 
computational implementation of the conflict-based account of 
CSEs, where adaptation effects were modeled as decreasing as a 
function of trials rather than as a function of time between trials 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). Similarly, the current data speak against 
the view that CSEs are a reflection of a proactive preparatory 
process based on expectations (Gratton et al., 1992), because 
one would assume the effects of such an anticipatory process to 
grow (or at least persist) over the post-stimulus/response interval. 
However, our results are compatible with a version of conflict 
adaptation where the decay of the adaptation effect is not trial-
bound but time-sensitive and fairly steep. This view of conflict 
adaptation would indeed predict CSEs to be most pronounced 
shortly after the control-triggering conflict event, and to sub-
sequently decay over time, irrespective of the appearance of a 
subsequent stimulus. This type of temporal dynamic of conflict-
induced control processes has in fact recently been used to suc-
cessfully model some aspects of first- and higher-order sequential 
effects in non-conflict 2-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task 
data (Gao et al., 2009).
While the conflict-monitoring model views CSEs explicitly as 
an expression of across-trial processing adjustments (Botvinick 
et al., 2001), it should be noted that the current results are also 
compatible with the possibility that conflict adaptation occurs 
within trial n-1 and it is the steadily decaying aftereffects of such 
within-trial control processes that produce the CSE on trial n. 
Some recent work has produced support for the basic existence 
of rapid within-trial processing adjustments (Taylor et al., 2007; 
Appelbaum et al., in press), and has suggested that these may 
be mediated by principally distinct mechanisms than those that 
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While the overall pattern of results was quite similar across 
the two present experiments, there were also some notable differ-
ences. First, overall RTs, congruency effects, and standard devia-
tions were much larger in Experiment 2. Second, in Experiment 1, 
significant CSEs were evident up to time bin 3, corresponding to 
ISI durations of 2,500–3,000 ms, whereas in Experiment 2, effects 
were only evident up until time bin 2, that is, an RSI duration of 
1,500–2,000 ms. In order to compare these data more directly, we 
can infer the mean effective RSIs from the ISI data in Experiment 1. 
Mean RTs across the different time bins in Experiment 1 were very 
homogenous, ranging from 586 to 593 ms. Given a fixed stimulus 
duration of 1 s, followed by the ISIs, the mean RSIs for the different 
time bins in Experiment 1 were therefore approximately 400 ms 
longer than those of corresponding bins in Experiment 2. While 
an overall increase in RT, conflict, and variability in Experiment 2 
could thus perhaps be expected at the shortest RSI level (being a 
fair bit shorter than the shortest RSIs in Experiment 1), there is no 
obvious reason for why responses would be slower and noisier at 
the longer intervals, although higher standard deviations could at 
least in part stem from a smaller trial count in Experiment 2. We 
can only speculate that these differences may have primarily arisen 
due to motivational differences between our samples; participants 
in Experiment 1 were predominantly graduate students perform-
ing for cash payment, whereas the subject pool in Experiment 2 
consisted of undergraduate students participating in exchange for 
course credits.
To conclude, while controlling for differential mnemonic effects, 
we characterized the shape of the time-course of CSEs, in order to 
evaluate hypotheses derived from different accounts of top-down 
attentional contributions to the CSE. Results across two experi-
ments indicated that CSEs are most pronounced at short post-
stimulus/response intervals, and decay (and disappear) thereafter. 
We interpret these data as incommensurate with a trial-bound, 
static version of conflict adaptation, and with an expectation-
based account of CSEs, but as compatible with a “phasic” version of 
conflict adaptation, where processing conflicts elicit a short-lived 
reinforcement of top-down attentional set.
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to ISI lengths of 1,250 and 5,750 ms. These authors reported 
higher CSE magnitudes at the shorter than at the longer ISI, but 
still observed a CSE at an ISI of 5,750 ms. The latter finding dif-
fers from data observed in the current study, where significant 
CSEs were not detected beyond a 2,500–3,000 ms ISI. This could 
be due to procedural differences between studies, including the 
fact that Wühr and Ansorge (2005) used a Simon task. More 
interestingly though, this could alternatively suggest that, while 
the general shape of the CSE time-course may always reflect a 
decline with increasing length of the post-stimulus/response 
interval (excepting extremely short intervals, cf. Notebaert et al., 
2006), the exact rate of decay may be context-dependent. In par-
ticular, it appears likely that the rate of decay of the CSE would 
vary as a function of the mean duration and overall distribution 
of ISI/RSI intervals. That the decay rate of CSEs across post-
stimulus/response intervals is not constant across experiments 
is certainly evident from the findings of significant mean CSEs 
in many neuroimaging studies that employed intervals in the 
3,000–6,000 ms range (e.g., Egner and Hirsch, 2005a,b; Egner 
et al., 2007, 2008), a range at which we did not detect significant 
CSEs in the current study. To explore this issue a little further, we 
re-analyzed behavioral data from a previous neuroimaging study 
using a highly similar face–word gender Stroop task and a uniform 
distribution of ISIs of 4,000, 5,000, and 6,000 ms (Egner et al., 
2008). While CSE magnitude decreased numerically with interval 
duration, the interaction involving ISI and CSE magnitude did 
not reach significance. However, since imaging studies typically 
only involve a very limited range of intervals and relatively low 
trial counts within each interval, they do of course not provide an 
ideal vehicle for testing ISI/RSI effects on CSEs. Thus, the exact 
way in which the temporal decay function of CSEs might vary 
with different interval distributions, and how such a temporal-
context modulation of conflict-triggered control might be imple-
mented neurally and computationally, pose interesting questions 
for future research. An alternative possibility that should also be 
entertained in this regard is that short-lived “reactive” CSEs that 
immediately follow a conflicting event might be ubiquitous, but 
that the presence of CSEs at longer intervals might be reliant on a 
different mechanism, such as the ability to maintain an attentional 
set over time, which may vary more widely across participants as 
well as between experimental contexts.
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